Public Choice Defended (reviewing \u3ci\u3eDemocracy Defended\u3c/i\u3e by Gerry Mackie) by Levmore, Saul
Public Choice Defended
Saul Levmoret
Democracy Defended, Gerry Mackie.
Cambridge, 2003. Pp xvi, 483.
I. POLITICAL SCIENCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Democracy Defended, by Gerry Mackie, is the latest shooting star
in the political science galaxy. The book, however, is fairly technical,
and is therefore one that few lawyers, law students, or even legal aca-
demics will read. This is unfortunate because the book contains many
terrific points, as important to lawyers who think about appellate deci-
sions, legislative intent, and voting law as to the book's intended audi-
ence. That audience consists of political scientists, whether established
or budding, who are locked in a long battle over the role of public
choice theory, and even of rational actor models quite generally.
The contemporary graduate student in political science is asked
to choose between a life of devotion to rational actor models and a
life of war against all model builders.' The model builders are mathe-
matically inclined, and fascinated with the irrationality of voter par-
ticipation, the expenditure patterns of interest groups, and the path
dependence of outcomes in democratic institutions. This last interest
follows in the wake of Arrow's Theorem and an enormous literature
on the inability of any collective choice, or preference aggregation,
mechanism to promise consistency, so long as it also guarantees sev-
eral other basic characteristics.2 With their tools sharpened, and some
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1 Undergraduates are often spared, or denied, this choice. Indeed, the battle within the
academic departments is so great that most undergraduate students who arrive at law school
have never encountered voting paradoxes or Arrow's Theorem-even though it is one of the
most widely written about topics in the professional literature. Apparently, the profession is so
divided that those who are not members of the rational choice fraternity decline to teach the
basic tools and paradoxes in introductory courses. As a result, democracy does not need much
"defending" against the gloomy version of public choice theory, discussed below, because only a
few thousand persons even learn about the theory.
2 Most readers who have come even this far will know that Arrow's Theorem says, in
rough terms, that no mechanism can promise unanimity (if all voters want X, X should emerge as
the winner), nondictatorship (the decision mechanism should not simply be that Smith always
gets his way, or always gets his way when matters are disputed), range (decisions should not be
reached by excluding alternatives), independence of irrelevant alternatives (if one prefers choco-
The University of Chicago Law Review
journals and university political science departments now secured, the
model builders have turned their attention to international law, to the
American presidency, and to virtually everything -including fields
that had once been considered the province of specialists. In the man-
ner of their economist cousins, or forebears, public choice theorists see
the world of politics as an orchard with low-hanging fruit. Everything
can be simplified and maximized, and every claim can be challenged
as empirically unverified. Conventional wisdom consists of claims
to be turned into testable hypotheses, with every result paraded as
original.
Because of their hegemonic tendencies, these rational choice
theorists and empiricists have created enemies, especially within the
world of political science. Mackie's book is written on behalf of, and
for, these enemies. Although the book is a bit technical for many of
them, they are bound to love it, beginning with its title and cover pic-
ture.3 Imagine that students in the humanities were told that a new
book showed that Newton and Leibniz had made colossal and never-
corrected errors in formulating the calculus. The book's author would
be an instant hero if only because a large part of this audience suffers
from math anxiety and would like nothing more than to be told that
some of the basic assumptions of calculus could not withstand a bit of
pressure. Some of Mackie's audience will take to his arguments with
comparable enthusiasm, much as many of us would to a respectable
scientist who "proved" that it was bad to be slim and that all the litera-
ture extolling physical exercise was based on flawed assumptions.'
late over vanilla ice cream, and then strawberry is offered, one might now ask for strawberry but
should not now prefer vanilla), and transitivity (if a group prefers X to Y, and Y to Z, then it
should be regarded as inconsistent or incoherent for the group to prefer Z over X). Unless these
requirements are met, the outcomes of group voting are path dependent, which is to say largely a
function of the order of consideration or of other historical facts. An accessible introduction can
be found in Kenneth A. Shepsle and Mark S. Bonchek, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior,
and Institutions 63-81 (W.W. Norton 1997).
3 The cover photo is of the ten-meter-tall "Goddess of Democracy" statue, installed in
Beijing by prodemocracy student demonstrators occupying Tiananmen Square. The implication
is that this book defends democracy as something worth fighting for, whereas public choice
theory, by implication, marginalizes democracy and its warriors because it claims that democratic
institutions are arbitrary, or incoherent. The book's own blurb begins by asking "Is there a public
good?" and describes the prevalent view of democracy in the political science community as
"meaningless." Mackie has so much that is interesting to say that it is a shame the book is mar-
keted with this silly claim. Dictators are almost sure to impose rules that no majority would
support; the "incoherence" claim of public choice generally refers to a disequilibrium with re-
spect to outcomes that could garner majority support. Mackie knows better, but then this book is
part of a war, and all is said to be fair in such an enterprise.
4 For one similarly welcomed study, see Emma Ross, Another Reason to Eat Dark Choco-
late; May Help Blood Vessels, but Watch the Weight Gain, Chi Sun-Times 33 (Aug 30, 2004) (not-
ing that such studies are "much to the delight of chocoholics").
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The "occasional problem" with democracy for social choice theo-
rists is that when a group engages in preference aggregation, neither
simple majority voting nor any other procedure can guarantee some
basic, intuitively appealing qualities. This is, of course, Arrow's Theo-
rem.' In order to avoid obvious and perhaps unacceptable restrictions
on range and participation, democratic procedures must, therefore,
suffer the possibility of cycling, or instability. In turn, the outcomes
generated by majority voting, sometimes produced by conventions
that appear to be designed to avoid instability, can fairly be described
as arbitrary, in the sense that some undemocratic or unappealing
means must be used to settle things down. If one imagines or defends
democracy as desirable because it produces the "will of the people" or
some such thing, then the idea that democratic processes can lead to
arbitrary or path-dependent outcomes can indeed be troubling. It is
precisely this trouble, this "problem" with democracy, that motivated
Mackie's work.
I turn first, in Part II, to the historical context of this problem
with democracy, and then, in Part III, to the idea that democracy may
need no defending, because even its incoherent and arbitrary patterns
are superior to those produced by nondemocratic processes. Part IV
deals with Mackie's claims about the absence of historical evidence of
cycling, or incoherence, in the U.S. Congress. Part V offers some novel
explanations for the historical record, and draws attention to the abil-
ity of public choice theory to illuminate constitutional structure. Part
VI concludes with some thoughts about theoretical and empirical
work, and with the hope that lawyers will not ignore the theoretical
insights of other disciplines as they await incontrovertible empirical
evidence of their practical significance.
II. ARROW'S SHADOW
As early as the eighteenth century, what we think of as the most
fundamental voting paradox was recognized and explored by the
Marquis de Condorcet.' It is perhaps unsurprising to learn, however,
that, hundreds of years earlier, great thinkers had puzzled over the
problem of choosing from among three (or more) alternatives, which
5 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (Yale 2d ed 1963).
6 See Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, An Essay on the
Application of Probability Theory to Plurality Decision-Making (1785) (Extract: Preliminary
Discussion. Analysis of Part One. Fourth Example: An Election Between Three Candidates), in
lain McLean and Fiona Hewitt, eds, Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and Political The-
ory 120 (Edward Elgar 1994) (translated by editors).
2005]
The University of Chicago Law Review
is, of course, when voting paradoxes can materialize Condorcet's
name is associated with the paradox that arises if, for example, there
are three individuals or subgroups, 1, 2, and 3, with preferences of
ABC, CAB, and BCA, respectively. With simple majority voting, A
defeats B, B defeats C, and yet C defeats A.8 It is not clear how many
people understood this paradox or even became aware of it after it
received Condorcet's attention. I am sorry to report that even today
an overwhelming majority of entering law students, arriving from the
nation's best colleges, and often majoring in political science, do not
know of this or any other voting paradox. Other well-known para-
doxes involve bundling of votes (and issues) and logrolling. These are
even less familiar, but also indicative of "arbitrary," though seemingly
democratically produced, results.9
An awfully good argument can be made for the proposition that
most democratic practices must have been fashioned in ignorance of
this problem. Thus, Thomas Jefferson, who corresponded with Con-
dorcet and met him on a number of occasions,10 drafted his Manual of
Parliamentary Practice for the U.S. Senate." It was an important influ-
ence on Robert's Rules of Order. Careful research, focused on the
direct evidence of correspondence and notes in books, as well as on
indirect evidence, shows that he and James Madison neither under-
stood the voting paradox nor proposed solutions to it.'3 A modern
positive theorist might point to a number of features of Jefferson's
parliamentary rules, and later rules as well, and argue that they deal
rather cleverly with the voting paradox," but this is a far cry from a
7 See lain McLean and Arnold B. Urken, eds, Classics of Social Choice 14-19 (Michigan
1995) (describing or imagining the strategic agenda-setting of Pliny the Younger while presiding
over the Roman Senate).
8 The uninitiated might take to the example most quickly by thinking of the voters' pref-
erences as capable of any ordering. Although many people often think of political choices as
points along a continuum that is increasingly or decreasingly attractive, for some matters it is
easy to see that this is not the case. Thus, a voter might prefer an expensive bridge, but then no
bridge at all over a modestly priced bridge, perhaps because this voter thinks that the noise and
pollution generated by a modest bridge dominate the modest benefit. Only if all voters prefer
bridges in increasing or decreasing order of expense will cycling not arise.
9 See Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxes and Interest Groups, 28 J Legal Stud 259, 263-68
(1999).
10 See lain McLean and Arnold B. Urken, Did Jefferson or Madison Understand Condor-
cet's Theory of Social Choice?, 73 Pub Choice 445 (1992).
11 Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice: For the Use of the Senate of the
United States (Joseph Milligan 2d ed 1812), reprinted in Wilbur Samuel Howell, ed, Jefferson's
Parliamentary Writings 353-426 (Princeton 1988).
12 Henry M. Robert, ed, Robert's Rules of Order 392 (Perseus 10th ed 2000) (first published
1876).
13 See McLean and Urken, 73 Pub Choice at 455-56 (cited in note 10).
14 See Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Rules, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Para-
dox, 75 Va L Rev 971, 991-96, 1012-23 (1989) (suggesting that common legislative mechanisms
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claim that Jefferson, Henry Robert, or Luther Cushing, father of many
legislatures' parliamentary codes,5 understood the paradox, or the
problem of cycling, and drafted rules in response to it. Thus, motion-
and-amendment voting of the kind that dominates our legislatures,
and is the stuff of Jefferson's Manual, can be understood as an ingen-
ious means of uncovering a Condorcet winner if one exists (which is
to say an option that is not unstable in a majoritarian system, as it
does not cycle but rather defeats all alternatives in head-to-head com-
petition). But even if Jefferson and others had intuitions about these
things, inclinations are a far cry from applications.
Returning to the evolution of public choice theory, there seems to
have been a period of more than a hundred years in which anyone
who noticed the voting paradox thought that it could be avoided,
solved, or ignored. This is hardly surprising; whenever I have seen
someone introduced to the basic voting paradox, the listener's reac-
tion has been to introduce a point system or other device in order to
try to avoid cycling. One of the great things about Arrow's Theorem is
that no one ever seems to intuit it. Thus, Jean-Charles de Borda seems
to have thought that his point-count system solved all difficulties.'6 The
modern reaction is more likely to be a conviction that markets over-
come Arrow.7 In settings where our predecessors might have assigned
points or switched to succession voting or approval voting, it is now
more common to see the introduction of an auction with real dollars
or with equal endowments of points or chits.
such as "motion-and-amendment" decisionmaking were developed against the backdrop of an
intuitive understanding of voting paradoxes). See also Adrian Vermuele, The Constitutional Law
of Congressional Procedure, 71 U Chi L Rev 361, 402-10 (2004) (analyzing voting rules and
quorum rules).
15 See Luther S. Cushing, Manual of Parliamentary Practice: Rules of Proceeding and De-
bate in Deliberative Assemblies (William J. Reynolds 4th ed 1845).
16 Point systems are discussed in Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice 61-64 (Cambridge
1979). Borda's name is attached to a point system of ranked preferences, but the idea seems to
have originated with Nicolaus Cusanus some 350 years earlier. See Nicolaus Cusanus, On Catho-
lic Harmony (1434), in McLean and Urken, eds, Classics of Social Choice 77,77-78 (cited in note 7)
(translated by editors) (describing a secret ballot point-count system). In Cusanus's point system
voters are instructed to match the numbers 1 through 10 with each of ten candidates, and the
winner is the candidate with the highest point total. According to Cusanus, such a system would
produce the
candidate adjudged best by the collective judgment of all present. Nor will any surer
method be discovered for reaching so infallible a formulation of collective decision. For this
method takes account of all comparisons of candidate to candidate-in whatever groupings
or combinations-that any elector can make. I have myself been unable to find a better
method than this even after much effort; and you can safely take it that a more perfect
method cannot be found.
Id at 78.
17 Mackie is right to bemoan the tendency of political scientists and economists to slip into
the suggestion that markets solve the problem of instability (pp 433-40).
2005]
The University of Chicago Law Review
But as all serious students of public choice know, Arrow's Nobel
Prize-winning work showed that no decisionmaking device could be
guaranteed to satisfy four fairly simple requirements, one of which
was the transitivity requirement (such that if A > B, and B > C, then
A > C). Simple majority voting may be more attractive than other
means of decisionmaking, but it cannot (always) avoid cycling. A point
system might have its uses, but a little experimentation will show that
it too can yield cycling, or incoherence. Single transferable voting
might seem attractive, but it too cannot promise to avoid cycling, and
especially so once strategic voting is contemplated. Arrow is every-
where, and the problem of cycling or instability looms large.
Once the message of Arrow's Theorem is properly absorbed, de-
pression can set in. As a title, Democracy Defended very much reflects
the view that if Arrow's Theorem is important, then democracy is un-
der serious attack, because majority voting is "incoherent" and such
voting is the centerpiece, or even essential characteristic, of democ-
racy." I am not sure that intransitivity or path dependence needed to
be taken as an insult, but perhaps it was inevitable that claims or evi-
dence of democracy's arbitrariness would be understood as arguments
against our democratic institutions. William Riker is most strongly
associated with these arguments that seem to puncture democracy's
balloon, as he sought to demonstrate the pervasiveness of cycling by
drawing attention to a number of votes in the U.S. Congress that ap-
peared to demonstrate cycling in action.'9 Perhaps the most threaten-
ing attack on conventional conceptions of democracy comes from the
idea, associated with Richard McKelvey,20 that cycling is not just possi-
ble, but something that can always be generated. If cycling is not just a
theoretical possibility, or an oddity, but rather an omnipresent feature
of democratic decisionmaking, then incoherent and meaningless begin
to seem like fair descriptions. But Arrow did not claim that every mat-
ter up for a vote, or other means of aggregation among three or more
persons, will cycle or otherwise run afoul of at least one of his four
basic requirements. Nine out of ten members of a community may
18 A democracy might require more than such voting, because voting may not be worth
much if there is no free press to inform voters. But this is hardly the place to work on perfect
definitions. See Amartya Sen, Freedom and Needs, New Republic 31 (Jan 10 & 17, 1994) (extol-
ling the effectiveness of democratic governments in avoiding large-scale disasters).
19 See William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism:A Confrontation Between the Theory
of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice 214-32 (W.H. Freeman 1982). Riker is, of course,
known for a great deal of other important work, but it is this empirical work that attracts
Mackie's attention, and is discussed below. For discussion of one of Riker's examples, the Wilmot
Proviso, see Part IV.
20 See generally Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multi-Dimensional Voting and
Some Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J Econ Theory 472 (1976).
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prefer for taxes to be as low as possible, in which case this group will
vote for low taxes, over high or medium taxes, if given half a chance to
do so. An important empirical question is, therefore, the frequency of
cycling, and a parallel question concerns the ways in which democratic
institutions avoid cycling if, indeed, they do.
III. LIVING WITH CYCLING
A. Avoiding Condorcet Losers
Even if cycling is ubiquitous, a means of combating Arrow's de-
stabilizing result is to suggest that cycling is often of little conse-
quence. Imagine, for example, that we ask a group to choose among
Greece, Egypt, and Turkey as the recipient of $1 billion of foreign aid.
Let us continue to contemplate three groups of voters, and further
consider the presence of an apparent Condorcet winner arising out of
preferences of GET, ETG, and TEG (where G represents Greece, and
so forth). Egypt is preferred in both head-to-head competitions. We
would have a cycle if the last group's ranking had been TGE, but it is
not. One way to think about the claim that cycling always occurs, so
long as the range of inputs is unconstrained, is to think of what an op-
ponent of foreign aid to Egypt might do. This voter, or politician,
might try to break up the pro-Egypt majority by introducing a fourth
alternative, such as a motion to provide the foreign aid to Egypt but
only on the condition that Egypt spend the money in the United
States. If parliamentary rules disallow this maneuver, they violate the
assumption about range, or "universal domain." After all, one could
always prevent cycling by limiting the number of permissible alterna-
tives to two-as parliamentary, committee, and political party rules
sometimes seem to do-and that solution, or bandage, ought not settle
any misgivings about democracy's problem.
If the pro-Egypt preference survives the introduction of the
fourth alternative, as it will if preferences are GEUT, ETGU, UTEG,
where U refers to the alternative of aid to Egypt with the condition
that the recipient's expenditures must be in the United States, then the
opponent might introduce yet another alternative, such as a grant of
$1.2 billion, rather than $1 billion, or a condition that Egypt cooperate
in specified ways with a new antiterrorist strategy. Unless voters are
inhumanly homogeneous, it is likely that any winning coalition can
eventually be divided, and that intransitivity can be generated. The
importance or prevalence of democracy's problem is thus quite con-
textual and perhaps subjective. Mackie would say that the difference
between $1 billion and $1.2 billion (going to the same country, after
all) may not be significant, and that cycling can therefore often be re-
garded as benign (p 114). It is, of course, difficult to know when the
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small things that split groups are important. Two hundred million dol-
lars is a significant amount of money to voters whose highest priority
will go unfunded if the money is devoted to foreign aid. Similarly, a
condition that expenditures must be made in the United States might
matter more to workers in some industries than to other voters. If de-
mocracy needs defending, we can surely do better than simply to insist
that instability is often unimportant because cycling voters sometimes
disagree about very little (pp 114-15).
A better defense of democracy draws on public choice theory and
a "compared to what?" manner of thinking. No thoughtful theorist
claims that democracy's incoherence problem makes it as bad as tyr-
anny. No one writes that democracy is worth fighting against, or worth
giving up without a battle, perhaps to the death. The public choice
problem, or insight, is simply that in some situations, or even in all
settings, the outcome of the democratic process may be one of several
outcomes that could have been produced given the voters' disparate
preferences. The result we observe in any given situation is to a degree
arbitrary-but it will always be drawn from that subset of possible
outcomes that mustered a majority's support. What emerges from a
democratic process might be disfavored by a (or another) majority of
the voters if they were permitted to compare this first outcome with
an alternative, or with every alternative. To be sure, that seemingly
preferred alternative would then also lose by majority vote to another
alternative, and so forth. On the other hand, to repeat, a nice thing
about the procedure most often used in our legislatures, puzzling as
parliamentary rules may first seem, is that it will find the single Con-
dorcet winner if one exists. Thus, if there is an alternative that is pre-
ferred to all others, it will prevail-and the same cannot be said for
most other decisionmaking systems, and it certainly cannot be said for
a tyranny.
Consider for example a group with the following preferences:
Subgroup 1: ABCD; Subgroup 2: BCDA; Subgroup 3: CADB. As be-
fore, A defeats B, B defeats C, but C defeats A, and without violating
other familiar and (I think normally) reasonable assumptions, no
method of aggregating preferences can avoid this cycle. Some proce-
dure, agenda setter, or randomizing device will determine the out-
come, and this can fairly be described as arbitrary. On the other hand,
there is nothing to be said for a method that produces D, which loses
in head-to-head competition with every other alternative. D, the
"Condorcet loser," will not emerge as the winner in any reasonable
democratic system, whereas a dictator or a random scheme could eas-
ily produce D as its outcome. There are, of course, thousands of D-like
alternatives out there, and we might optimistically say that among the
thousands of choices someone somewhere prefers, a democracy with
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simple majority voting is guaranteed to narrow the field to a few that
are not Condorcet losers. This can be framed as quite an accomplish-
ment, though I am sympathetic with Mackie's observation that stu-
dents and readers are often made to think that democracy is quite
unimpressive because it is described as arbitrary and incoherent (p 4).
A system that is arbitrary or procedure-driven within the class of the
top few choices among thousands could just as easily be described as
remarkably impressive.
Put slightly differently, it might be nice if our democracy did not
give an agenda setter special power, did not allow some interest
groups to outperform other claimants, and did not reward legislative
seniority as much as it does. But all democratic systems have their
problems, and a system that exhibits these scratches might still be
vastly superior to a nondemocratic system. These flaws might be de-
terminative where there is no Condorcet winner, for example, but a
system that always produces outcomes that have mustered at least one
majority vote is impressive enough.
B. Democracy's Real Flaws
The idea just developed, that democracy is attractive even in the
presence of cycling, raises the obvious question of whether democracy
has attractive qualities other than its ability to avoid Condorcet losers.
Democracy can be defended, as it were, by showing that the attack it
faces is a weak one, but also by demonstrating that it has other advan-
tages over its competition. On the other hand, a stronger defense
might be required in the face of other flaws and attacks, whether or
not Mackie takes note of them. I pause, therefore, to ask what it is,
exactly, that Mackie is defending, so that it might be compared to al-
ternatives as well as heralded or criticized on other grounds.
Democracy Defended is most usefully read, I think, if we define
democracy as a system of government and decisionmaking in which
majority votes decide many important matters. There are, to be sure,
many niceties to be observed or avoided. Some democracies may use
elected representatives to a greater degree than others, and a majority
of these representatives may have been put into place, and continue to
be controlled, by a well-placed quarter of the population, rather than
by a conventional majority.2' Some democracies may delegate more
21 The idea originates with James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Con-
sent 220-22 (Michigan 1962). It is that 51 percent of a legislature can enact bills, but each of the
members can be elected by 51 percent of a geographic district. The other 49 percent in that dis-
trict, as well as all the voters in the other 49 percent of the districts, might have voted against the
legislators now in the bare majority. Bicameralism, executive vetoes, and many other devices
might, of course, limit the minority's ability to impose costs on the majority. See Saul Levmore,
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decisionmaking than others, and the delegation may be to unelected
agents or to powers quite foreign to the electorate. Some democracies
may limit the franchise, through restrictions on citizenship and other
means. Some may give substantial power to minorities, often through
a variety of supermajority requirements, and sometimes by allowing
constituent states, or other groups, to control a disproportionate num-
ber of representatives. These countermajoritarian practices illustrate
the more general point that many democracies abide by prearranged
constitutional rules that are themselves countermajoritarian. Some of
these rules may have been politically necessary at the time of the for-
mation of the political entity, and others may simply have been
deemed wise or just. A stubborn debater might insist that we do not
really have a firm definition of democracy, so that it is impossible to
proceed, much less to defend the undefined, but I will proceed under
the assumption that most readers will be impatient with this question.
Democracy to us simply means that many important things are de-
cided by majority votes undertaken with a large and (somewhat) neu-
trally drawn segment of those most affected by these votes. In a de-
mocracy, a determined majority of the population gets its way, though
repeated votes and instructions to agents may be necessary.
But in almost any form, democracy comes with a towering
strength, as readers familiar with public choice know. The strength is
that simple majority rule has a great deal to be said for it. Where pref-
erences are at stake, majority rule (defined in a way that includes plu-
rality voting)2 is intuitively appealing: it is not biased in favor of any
particular outcome or person, whether voter or dictator; it is posi-
tively responsive to increased support (if there is a tie, and then a new
voter prefers X over Y, X wins); and it does not restrict the range of
what can be considered."
Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better Than One?, 12 Intl Rev L & Econ 145, 151-55
(1992) (exploring historical and logical explanations of bicameralism).
22 For this triumph of plurality voting, see Robert E. Goodin and Christian List, Unique
Virtues of Plurality Rule: Generalizing May's Theorem (working paper Sept 2004), online at
http://econwpa.wustl.edu/eps/pe/papers/0409/0409010.pdf (visited Feb 14, 2005). Plurality voting,
it should be noted, can miss some Condorcet winners that simple majority voting would yield (if
the right options are put up for vote), but that is a topic for another day.
23 These characteristics are known as anonymity and neutrality.
24 This is sometimes known as universal domain, and we might take it to include admissi-
bility, or the idea that voters can also rank the alternatives as they wish. These several require-
ments, or assumptions, and the conclusion regarding simple majority rule, are known as May's
Theorem. The appeal of simple majority rule is great where the minority is unlikely to have more
intense feelings, or preferences, than the majority. See Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democ-
racy 159-60 (Oxford 1996) (describing May's Theorem and noting that the anonymity axiom is
"most appealing on binary issues for which it is reasonable to assume that the intensity of sup-
port" is roughly the same on both sides of the issue).
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Where decisionmaking is not a matter of competing preferences,
or preference aggregation, the strength of simple majoritarianism is,
instead, that a majority is likely to get things "right." Where voters are
each more likely to be right than wrong, or where some are gifted in
this manner and others are right and wrong at random, a simple ma-
jority is increasingly likely to get an increasingly large group to the
correct result."' If we further imagine that most voters want to get the
correct result, where the question at hand is one with a right and
wrong answer, majority decisionmaking is even better because the
voters are free to listen to experts or to delegate appropriately. It does
not take too much optimism to say that simple majority rule is ex-
tremely attractive because it is either an attractive form of preference
aggregation or a very appealing means of finding the right answer. The
group need not know which of these two tasks it is engaged in, and
that is especially useful if many decisions reflect some combination of
right answers and preferences. These two characteristics undergird
democracy's towering strength. A dictatorship, or for that matter a
supermajoritarian scheme, cannot claim these strengths; nor can they
claim to avoid Condorcet losers.
Mackie's defense is against the attack associated, rightly or not,
with Arrow's Theorem, though he might have prepared for an attack
based on the low level of participation in many democracies or for
one based on the agency problem confronting citizens who must dele-
gate decisionmaking and execution to politicians and other agents.
Neither problem falsifies the claims about democracy's great
strengths, but both make the boasts somewhat hollow. If, for example,
only a few voters troubled themselves to be well informed and to ex-
press their preferences, we would be uninspired by claims of neutral-
ity, universal domain, and avoidance of Condorcet losers. Simple ma-
jority voting might then even be worse than an alternative that tried
to assess the preferences of the silent majority.
Even with considerable voter turnout, democracy might need de-
fending if those who vote are a breed apart. Public choice-though
not that part of the field inspected by Mackie-is famously interested
in the question of why a rational citizen would vote. The chance of
influencing the outcome of an election is, essentially, zero, so that it
appears irrational to expend any energy at all on election day. The
deep problem for public choice theory is that if we cannot explain
participation, then we have no business building models based on ra-
tional, self-interested actors; whether these models focus on political
25 This is the essence of Condorcet's Jury Theorem, discussed at some length in Saul
Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 Stan L Rev 111, 142-49 (2000).
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or economic behavior, they are all suspect. But there is also a problem
for democracy. If the best explanation for voter participation treats
voting as a form of consumption, then the product of such consump-
tion decisions by a fraction of the eligible voters might not deserve
much respect.
Agency problems present different problems for democracy's de-
fenders. For most of us, agency problems make democracies yet less
perfect, much as they add costs to most things we value, but we have
no reason to prefer dictatorships or ubiquitous supermajority rules
any more than before, inasmuch as they will suffer from agency prob-
lems of their own. But someone who sees democracy as severely as-
saulted by occasional cycling might also see it as vulnerable in the
presence of imperfect agents. Moreover, the model builders' obsession
with politicians as self-interested actors makes agency costs loom
large. I might hope that politics attracts public-regarding persons, but
one who thinks of all persons as self-interested must regard delegation
and representation as troubling. Adam Smith, and the profession that
followed him, was able to advance the idea that numerous selfish ac-
tors might, without realizing it, form socially useful markets. But it is
much more difficult to argue that politicians, or other agents, contrib-
ute to the common good by being selfish." It may be that such agents
can be controlled at reasonable cost, and that political institutions
should be understood as creating checks on these agents, but democ-
racy would surely be even more attractive if politicians could fairly be
described as out to serve the common good or, perhaps, if they could
be paid in a way that aligned their economic well-being with the
common good. Instead, we must hope that regular elections serve to
discipline agents, and that restrictions on the ability of private princi-
pals to reach agreements with these agents can be drafted and en-
forced effectively. We can also fall back on the argument that any al-
ternative to democracy will also suffer from agency problems. In any
event, readers who expect Democracy Defended to take up this prob-
lem, or that of (rational) low participation, will be disappointed.
26 See Michael E. DeBow and Dwight R. Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding)
Public Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 Tex L Rev 993, 997 (1988) (analogizing
satisfaction from voting one's preferences with satisfaction from consuming goods and services).
27 The argument would need to be that politicians are rewarded through salaries and other
means, that they keep their positions by pleasing the electorate or its median voter, and that by
doing so they produce a string of Condorcet winners or "right" answers while keeping transac-




An important piece of Mackie's defense, and certainly the part of
the enterprise to which he devotes the most effort and pages, is the
argument that the problem of majoritarian incoherence, or intransitiv-
ity, simply does not materialize. William Riker had pointed to in-
stances of congressional cycles. For example, Riker argued that there
was a disequilibrium in the 1840s among three choices: an appropria-
tion proposed by President Polk aimed at paying the Mexican army to
accept a settlement of the war; the same appropriation with an
amendment (the "Wilmot Proviso") providing that there would be no
slavery in lands to be acquired from Mexico; and the status quo, of no
appropriation (pp 241-42). Mackie proceeds with determination to
debunk this evidence, and similar claims made by Riker with respect
to a number of important votes throughout American history (pp 197-
334). Readers with a taste for detail and for American political history
will enjoy the arguments. I will not take issue with Mackie's hard
work. Let us assume that Mackie is the perfect social scientist and his-
torian, and that he has demonstrated that there is not a single example
of cycling in the history of the Congress. What then should we make of
the potential for "arbitrary" outcomes in the face of cycling prefer-
ences-if these cycles do not in fact arise?
Mackie's method of empirical criticism is familiar and is often
found in second-generation work, by which I mean work that exam-
ines the theoretical breakthroughs of an earlier age. This is a common
pattern in academic work: a first-generation insight works its way into
conventional academic wisdom, and is then followed by a claim that
the insight is of limited importance because it is overly theoretical,
and not empirically important. The theorist tries to preempt such criti-
cism by offering examples, or real-world applications, alongside the
original insight, but the force of the theory need not, of course, depend
on the quality or presence of the proffered examples.
The pattern is common in law and economics scholarship. Thus, a
scholar might import the concept of moral hazard or risk aversion
from the economics to the legal literature. In the first generation, the
scholar "explains" or models things such that the reader can see that
law may reflect, or appear to react to, these ideas. Thus, American law
famously declines to reward rescuers or to penalize those who fail to
effect (even easy) rescues. The law and economics scholar stresses be-
havioral effects, and introduces ideas like moral hazard and risk aver-
sion by suggesting that law offers no rewards to rescuers because to
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do so might generate excessive expenditures by rescuers.8 The argu-
ment might extend to the claim that more "accidents" would be gen-
erated in the presence of rewards, as reward seekers might actually
create situations where rescues would be required. Nor does law pe-
nalize a failure to rescue, the argument continues, for fear that poten-
tial (genuine and altruistic) rescuers will avoid locations where rescues
are likely to be needed because of the threat of liability or other pen-
alty.9
In the second round of scholarly consideration, a critic can be ex-
pected to ask whether there is any empirical evidence that more acci-
dents will be generated by rewards, or that fewer rescues will material-
ize in the face of risk-averse potential rescuers. The absence of empiri-
cal evidence does not, I think, necessarily make the first theorist
wrong. Law might, after all, be designed with a problem in mind, and
drafters or judges might simply mistake the relative importance of
conflicting behavioral effects.
Note that the first-round theoretical argument is often not nor-
mative in character. I suppose that if someone proposed a change in
rescue law, then empirical evidence would be important. We might be
disinclined to suggest a change in law without empirical evidence as to
the presence of the moral hazard problem, say, or of avoidance (of a
likely rescue spot) itself. Unfortunately, it may not be clear where to
look for empirical evidence; a researcher who found no reduction in
beach visits following a jurisdiction's passage of a statute penalizing a
failure to rescue might find some other setting where the original be-
havioral argument proved profound. The presence of numerous wit-
nesses at the beachfront may give people confidence that they will not
be mistakenly penalized for a failure to rescue, or the enactment of a
penalty may simply keep rational beachgoers home because they
share the intuition that rescuers will stay away. But, of course, the em-
pirical inquiry might have confirmed the original insights if it had
been undertaken at a different group of beaches or in an entirely dif-
ferent setting. The failure to find empirical support for the proposition
that rewards generate more losses, or for the notion that a penalty
attached to a failure to rescue will cause an increase in the number of
casualties by discouraging would-be rescuers, raises some interesting
questions. But such a failure does not make the original claim useless.
But what if repeated searching turns up no evidence of the moral
hazard? Observers are free to suggest that the earlier theorizing was
28 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Salvors Finders, Good Samaritans, and
Other Rescuers:An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J Legal Stud 83,91-92 (1978).
29 Id at 119-24 (noting that if shipowners were liable for failing to rescue distressed vessels,
there would be less shipping).
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likely unimportant, but more cautious or supportive observers might
argue that the moral hazard danger is implicitly or explicitly recog-
nized in the world, so that there is no natural experiment. Wherever
our researcher might have found the best evidence, rewards have al-
ready been withheld, and penalties not imposed, so as to avoid the
very effects that the theorist predicted (or would in the future pre-
dict).
Imagine next that early theorists pointed to supposed examples
or evidence in favor of their arguments as to the costs of rewards andpenalties, but then closer inspection proves that these examples are
beside the point or were even misreported. The theory might seem
less useful because there is now some doubt as to whether supportive
empirical evidence will ever exist, but there is no particular reason to
dismiss the theory. A really good theory about obesity leading to heart
attacks is not made useless by a discovery that the theorist's own evi-
dence in the form of several obese patients who suffered heart attacks
can be thrown out because of new evidence that what each patient
experienced was not, in fact, a heart attack. William Riker's evidence
that Congress engaged in cycling might have made his claims about
cycling more impressive (though he did not, of course, discover cy-
cling), but pulverizing this evidence does not make the theory wrong.
It would be another thing if, in a huge sample of obese patients,
there were no heart attacks or simply fewer than in a control group.
Indeed, this may be the structure of Mackie's claim: Congress engages
in many votes, and if none appears to cycle, then cycling does not exist
or cannot be important. There is some mystery as to where the burden
of proof ought to fall. Even if it turned out that there were ten or
twenty important examples in U.S. congressional history where cycling
occurred, Mackie might argue that cycling is relatively unimportant
because this number of occurrences is awfully small in a population of
thousands of important votes. Similarly, the number of occurrences
need not be zero to make the point that democracy does not produce
unstable or arbitrary outcomes in any important way.
The problem, I think, is that congressional history is a terribleplace to look for evidence of cycling. Mackie looks there, we might
presume, because that was, for the most part, where Riker staked his
empirical claim. But it was probably the wrong stage for both. Anyone
with three or more strong-minded family members is acutely aware of
cycling-and is likely to be of the view that cycling will (as opposed to
could) appear everywhere. Any teacher who asks a class to vote on
the format for a final exam, or on the date a makeup class should be
conducted, would be astonished to encounter the claim that cycling is
little more than a theoretical possibility. Similarly, and moving to more
important votes, presidential primaries with numerous candidates of-
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ten seem capable of cycling, though it is suppressed by single-round
plurality voting. Pollsters who ask about hypothetical head-to-head
competitions might point to likely cycles, but such polling is occasional
rather than regular, and distorted by candidates' dropping out of the
primaries after a poor showing in a few states. If we engaged in head-
to-head competition, I think it likely that cycling would be a regular
phenomenon. John Kerry might not have defeated every other candi-
date in pairwise competition in Iowa and in other caucuses and prima-
ries in 2004; Jimmy Carter (1976), George H.W. Bush (1988), Bill Clin-
ton (1992), and Ronald Reagan (1980) hardly seem likely to have
been Condorcet winners in the full fields in which they might have
competed at the party level. Multiple-candidate general elections
might also produce frequent cycling; at various points in 2004, John
McCain might have been able to defeat both George W. Bush and
John Kerry in round-robin voting, in a general rather than one-party
vote.
The reason that cycling is easier to identify in informal votes and
in multiplayer primaries is that, in these contexts, range is less re-
stricted than it is in Congress. Our two-party system, with some disci-
pline, suppresses cycles in November elections very much as it re-
strains them in Congress. Motion-and-amendment voting further bur-
ies cycling. It asks a legislative body to vote yes or no, and with but
two alternatives, cycling is impossible.30 Nor is it possible to have nu-
merous alternatives on the table at once. 1 Finally, members can nor-
mally move to divide questions, so that pieces of a bundle will be
voted on one at a time, and this too is likely to reduce or eliminate
potential cycling.32
We might expect the most frequent cycling in informal multiper-
son settings, next most in primaries with numerous candidates, some
on the Supreme Court," and the least in Congress-where parties,
30 I have argued that the very point of the motion-and-amendment procedure might be not
only to uncover Condorcet winners but also to suppress evidence of cycling, lest it lead to a
dissatisfied and depressed citizenry. It is not simply the head-to-head format that suppresses
evidence of cycling, but also the common restriction on reintroducing defeated alternatives. If
motion A loses, and then motion B is defeated, in consecutive up or down votes, and motion C is
then passed, it is not normally permissible to reintroduce A without supermajority support,
though A might be preferred to C. See Levmore, 75 Va L Rev at 1022 (cited in note 14). This
observation about motion-and-amendment voting suggests, in passing, that if we are to observe
cycling in legislatures, it will need to be over time.
31 Id at 1022, 1026-27 (describing restrictions on the reintroduction of questions already
decided, and theorizing that multiple alternatives are permitted precisely where a Condorcet
winner is unlikely).
32 Id at 1004-07 (discussing rules on dividing the question).
33 Cycling on the Supreme Court has become a subject of serious study, after some theoriz-
ing in an earlier generation. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv L
[72:777
Public Choice Defended
committees, and parliamentary rules all work to limit range. I have
suggested elsewhere that this might not be accidental, and that range
or pairwise comparison is restricted precisely where cycling is mostlikely. ' But I will not rehash that argument here, nor argue about the
frequency of cycling in given settings. I think it obvious that we would
expect cycling to be less likely in Congress than in other settings. But
the point is not simply to redirect empirical inquiry. It is to draw atten-
tion to the ways in which law pushes cycling further back in the deci-
sionmaking process, and thus suppresses evidence of cycles in the
most visible political and legal institutions.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
I have already drawn attention to the ways in which a two-party
system, motion-and-amendment voting, and rules against reintroduc-
tion limit consideration of multiple alternatives over which cycling is
likely in a legislature. But the work of suppression is also done by
many other rules, and an interesting empirical inquiry would aim to
discover the relative contributions of these various tools. Moreover, I
suspect that we have yet to discover many causes of "noncycling."
Consider, for example, single-subject restrictions, which require votes
to be taken one matter at a time unless another subject is "germane."
Many state legislatures operate under such a restriction," though ger-
maneness is a slippery concept.6 Referenda and constitutional
amendments also, and more famously, normally require single-subject
consideration. 7
One explanation, or rationalization, for this rule comes from the
literature on unconstitutional conditions, and it is that the ability to
Rev 802, 811-31 (1982) (applying Arrow's Theorem to analysis of the Supreme Court and con-
cluding that it explains the inevitability of institutional inconsistency over time). But cycling may
also be suppressed at the Court, and stare decisis and standing rules may be the leading means of
such suppression. See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social
Choice, 83 Cal L Rev 1309,1356-57, 1363-64 (1995).
34 See Levmore, 75 Va L Rev at 1025-26 (cited in note 14) (noting that succession voting,
rather than motion-and-amendment voting, is most likely to be employed when there are a large
number of available alternatives for filling blanks).
35 See Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure: Re-
thinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38 Harv J on
Legis 103, 114-16 (2001) (describing the single-subject rule in state legislatures).
36 For an example of a (flexible) court wrestling with germaneness, see Kennedy Wholesale,
Inc v State Board of Equalization, 53 Cal 3d 245, 279 Cal Rptr 325, 330-32 (1991) (concluding
that a tobacco-related initiative was valid, even where some of its spending measures were not
directly related to tobacco).
37 See, for example, Philip L. Dubois and Floyd Feeney, Lawmaking by Initiative: Issues;Options and Comparisons 127-29 (Agathon 1998); Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives
and the Single Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L Rev 936,949-53 (1983).
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attach conditions, or logrolling of a sort, empowers factions.
38 Poorly
organized majorities might more often prevail when given the oppor-
tunity to vote on matters one at a time. But single-subject restrictions
might also limit cycling. One way to break up an apparent Condorcet
winner is to divide the majority with a second subject, which may or
may not be truly germane to the first. If, for example, foreign aid to
Egypt is preferred over aid to either Greece or Turkey, then a dis-
senter who hoped to break up the seemingly invincible pro-Egypt coa-
lition might add an amendment to the aid bill. Imagine an amendment
to add three consular positions in Egypt, or one consisting of a resolu-
tion that called on the European Union to admit Turkey to its mem-
bership. Such add-ons might seem relevant to some voters, and even
germane to courts (though we do not have single-subject restrictions
on congressional bills). It is easy to see that these amendments could
reduce support for the aid component and lead to cycling. In turn, a
single-subject restriction can block this strategy and thus reduce cy-
cling.
I do not mean to argue that single-subject restrictions are either
good or bad-even if courts could rule on germaneness in a coherent
and evenhanded fashion. Nor is the point to attack or defend democ-
racy. It is, instead, to give a casual example of how public choice the-
ory can inform constitutional law and invigorate comparative consti-
tutional work. A variety of our institutions and rules can be seen
against the backdrop of Arrow's Theorem, and from this perspective it
is apparent that they restrict range or otherwise reduce cycling and
instability. I should say that it is possible that single-subject restrictions
do not reduce cycling, and indeed it is even plausible, though I think
unlikely, that they exacerbate the "problem" of cycling by disallowing
compromises that would emerge as Condorcet winners. Mine is an
intuition, and empirical inquiry directed at this question might inform
us as to the net effect of this and other rules.
Mackie, I should report in passing, is a devoted advocate for the
unimportance of cycling rather than an inquirer into constitutional
structure. To take but one example, he makes the very interesting
point that deliberation can sometimes reduce numerous alternatives
38 See Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 Harv L Rev 4, 23-24 (1988) (noting the potential for majority factions to
impose conditions that are onerous on minority factions). See also Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational
Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U Pa L Rev 1293, 1351-54
(1984) (focusing on the idea of evaluating conditions with historical baselines, but touching on
the way in which conditions restrict sets of choices); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading,
Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 S Ct Rev 309, 349




to two (pp 389-92). A legislature or other group might be on its way to
cycling with numerous alternatives, but deliberation might lead the
group to see the advantage of some proposals over others on the table,
or to see that some intense preferences can be satisfied with modest
compromise. But, of course, it is also true-as Mackie must surely
have seen-that deliberation can increase the propensity to cycle. We
have all been in groups that thought they were voting on A versus B,
until deliberation revealed clever "compromises," or other options,
that divided and reorganized voters and produced cycles where none
seemed present in the first place. Deliberation and single-subject re-
strictions thus have something in common. We do not gain much by
insisting that either of these realities, unincorporated as they are in
Arrow's Theorem, Condorcet's work, or other centerpieces of public
choice theory, ruins Arrow's Theorem or destroys or defends democ-
racy itself. We can, however, benefit from examining ways in which
these and other facts on the ground promote or reduce consistency.
With this information in hand, we might even advance arguments
about whether such practices do more good than harm, and where
they might best be encouraged.
VI. LAW AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Political scientists, including Gerry Mackie, are obviously doing
important and interesting work in evaluating and even debunking
empirical claims about cycling in Congress. Democracy Defended
makes a great deal of the absence of such cycles. My own intuition,
developed by extrapolating from the world of informal votes andpresidential primaries, is that cycling would occur often in Congress if
permitted to develop. But other reasonable people might think that
the basic theories are much less interesting if we see little evidence of
cycling in Congress -and especially if the absence of cycling continues
in periods when party discipline seems relatively weak. Still, these dif-
ferent reactions need not be seen as defending or attacking democ-
racy. Political scientists have their own parochial reasons to battle over
these things, but lawyers need not do so. Citizens and academics with
an interest in constitutional structure have a great deal to gain from apublic choice perspective, though empirical evidence from the public
choice industry is likely to play but a small role.
This clash between theorists and empirical evidence, or between
theorists and skeptics, optimists, or revisionists, as the case may be, is
repeated almost everywhere an interesting insight appears in the
world of law. In areas ranging from capital punishment to gun control,
from speed limits to term limits, and from school vouchers to no-fault
insurance, empirical evidence plays a remarkably small role in forming
or changing views. It is easy to say and believe that empirical evidence
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is important, but it might be fairer to say that we wish it could be so.
At the very least, however, we can hope that our empiricists look for
evidence where it is most likely to be found.
For some time now, academic lawyers have thrived on interdisci-
plinary study. Ours is an industry that has become accustomed to the
manner in which law appropriates developments in other disciplines.
The most frequent partners, often willing but sometimes not, have
been economics, political science, and psychology, and such subfields
as game theory, options, public choice, international relations, decision
theory, and behavioral theory. The pattern is rather predictable,
though I do not mean to make this style of scholarship look easy or
trivial, for it is not. A law professor reads about an insight in one of
these allied fields, such as the tendency of humans to give too much
weight to recent experiences. Our legal academic then searches, as it
were, for a legal application. At times the connection will produce
normative work, perhaps of the form: "Judges should do X, because
people on their own will do Y (citing the social science literature), and
Y is something they would wish to be protected from." In other set-
tings, or perhaps simply in different hands, the interdisciplinary ven-
ture will be positive in style, and perhaps of the following form: "Rule
Q in law seems ill-formed or puzzling, but it may well be optimal once
one realizes that people on their own would do Y, which is socially
undesirable."
Interdisciplinary work has thus made academic law a profession
in which there is a substantial payoff to versatility, and perhaps even
to versatility over genuine expertise. The biologist, anthropologist, or
psychologist who reads about information-forcing rules in the litera-
ture on contract law or about the different deterrence effects, if any,
between strict liability and negligence in tort law, is unlikely to find
this knowledge of much use when it is time to produce the next schol-
arly work in the reader's own discipline. In contrast, the law professor
and lawyer who read in these other disciplines can take almost every
new theory to the office. I suspect that this is so because law is a disci-
pline that, more than any other, pays attention to how it took its pre-
sent shape, how it can be understood, and how it might be reshaped. A
lawyer might take from this Review an appreciation of the role single-
subject restrictions can play in preventing cycling and unstable majori-
ties, but this insight about constitutional structure may be of little use
to the social scientist. Nothing in Mackie's book will or ought to
dampen the lawyer's enthusiasm for interdisciplinary gain. The danger
is that the work will be cited as standing for the proposition that vot-
ing paradoxes and Arrow's Theorem are theoretical moves with no
real-world basis, and that law professors and their students will then
choose to do without a truly important set of tools.
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